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game model of the determination of emissions in a quantity-rationing setting. We
model the emission capping negotiations using the best response dynamic pro-
cess and provide natural conditions under which the process has a unique and
globally asymptotically stable stationary point. We then analyze the link be-
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1.1 The problem
Consider n nations whose ﬁrms emit some pollutant into a shared medium. The ag-
gregate emission damages the interests of consumers in all these nations. The status quo
situation is that each emitting ﬁrm chooses its production plan, and therefore emission, to
maximize its own proﬁt, subject to domestic regulatory constraints, without taking into
account the externality suﬀered by the consumers. For standard speciﬁcations of national
welfare that take consumer welfare into account, the resulting outcome is ineﬃcient. Sup-
pose these nations attempt to improve upon this situation by means of a protocol that
caps each nation’s emission to some country-speciﬁc level.1
Each nation consists of two classes of entities: ﬁrms that emit pollution and consumers
who suﬀer the damage from the aggregate international emission. While the production
and emission decisions are made by the ﬁrms, the emission caps under the protocol are
negotiated by the national governments without the ﬁrms being at the table. As seems rea-
sonable, we model the negotiating national governments as being concerned not only about
the proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms but also about the damage suﬀered by domestic consumers.
We assume that every nation has the sovereign right to choose the mechanism for
allocating among the domestic ﬁrms the emission rights received by it in the form of the
national emission cap. We do not model this choice and take it as exogenously given. In
eﬀect, domestic regulation is black-boxed and assumed to be eﬀective, which allows us
to focus on the issue of incentive compatibility in the emission capping process without
worrying about subsequent domestic implementation issues. It also allows us to aggregate
each nation’s ﬁrms into a single national ﬁrm.2 For the sake of convenience, we shall also
aggregate each nation’s consumers into a single national consumer.
Our model has three stages. In Stage 1, privately informed Nations choose invest-
ments to alter their exogenously given types. A nation’s type consists of two parameters.
The ﬁrst is private capital, which consists of the ﬁxed inputs that determine the nation’s
(equivalently, the national ﬁrm’s) production technology. The second is adaptation capital,
which determines the relationship between aggregate emission and the damage suﬀered by
that nation (equivalently, by the national consumer). Adaptation capital consists of all
assets that are used to mitigate the damage caused by emissions, e.g., water and forest
management systems, meteorological facilities, knowledge of the ways to cope with the
eﬀects of pollution, research facilities that generate such technologies, etc. The distinction
1between the two kinds of capital is functional in nature. In Stage 1, each Nation may en-
hance these parameters via investment. In Stage 2, the national governments use the best
response dynamic to negotiate emission caps: given a proposed proﬁle of caps, the new
proﬁle of proposed caps is the proﬁle of best responses to the given proﬁle. As a cap cannot
be imposed on a sovereign nation, the negotiations continue until a stationary proﬁle is
reached.3 In Stage 3, a stationary point of the best response dynamic is implemented as
the proﬁle of caps and the national ﬁrm in each nation chooses a production and emission
plan subject to that nation’s emission cap.
We now ﬂesh out the model described above, ﬁrst with some remarks regarding its
theoretical underpinnings and our motives for constructing such a model, and then some
comments regarding its special features.
The caps negotiated in Stage 2 of the model are self-enforcing as, by deﬁnition, no
country can unilaterally improve upon a stationary proﬁle. Accordingly, the ﬁrst objective
of this paper is to provide a theory of self-enforcing emission cap determination. This in-
volves showing the existence, uniqueness and appropriate stability properties of stationary
proﬁles of caps, as is done in Section 2.3. Our substantive goal in this paper is to use this
theory to answer the following broad question in a number of settings: given that nations
diﬀer in terms of technology and resources, what investment strategies might a nation (or
its ﬁrm) pursue prior to capping so as to bring about an emission cap proﬁle that is optimal
from its point of view?
An issue that is central to a large portion of the comparable literature (see Section
1.2) is a nation’s participation decision vis-a-vis the protocol. We shall formally endo-
genize each nation’s participation decision with respect to the protocol by identifying
“non-participation” with an inﬁnite cap in equilibrium. While we formally allow this pos-
sibility, in equilibrium every nation will accept a ﬁnite emission cap that is lower than its
status quo emission level, i.e., every nation will choose to “participate”. As the caps are
incentive compatible (by deﬁnition) and implementable by the national governments (by
assumption), the equilibrium aggregate emission will be lower than the status quo level.
Indeed, the equilibrium outcome will be a Pareto improvement over the status quo and
this result does not rely on international transfers.
We assume that the emission rights implied by a cap are not tradeable internationally.
It is natural to wonder why a model with non-tradeable emission rights should even be
considered as voluntary trading after nations are endowed with rights should be Pareto im-
proving. This improvement, however, is merely with respect to the given endowments. In
2our context, endowments of emission rights are not given exogenously but are determined
endogenously via negotiations. Thus, ex ante welfare analysis, i.e., prior to the determi-
nation of emission rights endowments, requires the comparison of equilibrium outcomes
resulting from various arrangements for determining emission rights endowments. In this
paper, we explore the implications of an autarkic post-protocol regime.
Another implicit assumption underlying our approach is that standard tax-subsidy
type remedies for dealing with externalities are inapplicable in the modelled environment
because of the lack of appropriate institutions that can exercise supranational ﬁscal au-
thority over sovereign nations.
As will become clear, our model applies directly to a pollutant that dissipates quickly
and therefore does not have cumulative eﬀects via its stock. However, it can also be used
as a building block for a model to study the problem of restricting the future ﬂow of a
cumulative pollutant as, at a point of time, accounting and paying for past emissions is an
analytically distinct problem from that of regulating future ﬂows: while the former is the
problem of apportioning a noxious cake of exogenously given size, the latter is the problem
of regulating the marginal externalities generated by future emissions. However, unlike in
the case of evanescent pollutants, cumulative pollutants will require our model to serve as
a stage game in a dynamic game with the pollution stock serving as the state variable.
We now discuss the following features of our model: (a) the dynamic cap negotiation
process, (b) the heterogeneity of nations, (c) the asymmetry of information among the na-
tions, (d) the possibility of manipulating the capping process via the investment decisions,
and (e) the decomposition of nations into entities with divergent attitudes to emissions.
Feature (a) is the technical fulcrum of this paper. For each proﬁle of national types,
the equilibrium proﬁle of caps is the stationary point of the capping negotiations, which
are formalized using the best response dynamic. This formalism has a number of useful
technical properties that enable a general and straightforward attack on our substantive
questions. We ﬁrst characterize the set of stationary points of the dynamic process as
the set of Nash equilibria of an artiﬁcial complete information game. Given this charac-
terization, the existence of stationary points follows simply from an application of Nash’s
existence theorem. Additional natural assumptions regarding the primitives of the model
imply that the artiﬁcial game is dominance-solvable. This guarantees the existence of a
unique Nash equilibrium of the artiﬁcial game, and therefore, a unique stationary point of
the capping negotiations. Moreover, the steady-state solution of the best response dynam-
ical system corresponding to the unique stationary point is globally asymptotically stable:
3starting from any proposed proﬁle of caps, the negotiations will converge asymptotically to
the unique stationary proﬁle. Pulling together the various technical results, we know that,
for every proﬁle of types, there exists a unique equilibrium proﬁle of caps, and that the
resulting mapping from type proﬁles to cap proﬁles is simply characterized and suﬃciently
smooth under natural assumptions regarding the primitives of the model. This facilitates
the comparative statics exercises that underly the substantive results. Moreover, as sug-
gested by the correspondence principle, the assumptions that imply the stability properties
of the dynamics also yield useful information for signing the comparative statics exercises.
With respect to feature (b), it is obvious that the potential participants in a capping
regime may be heterogeneous. We model the heterogeneity by allowing national types to
vary across nations and analyze its eﬀects on Stage 2 outcomes (see Proposition 3.1.5 and
Section 3.2). It is also instructive to account for the evolution of national types. We study
this issue by interpreting Stage 1 investment as the means for adjusting a nation’s type.
This allows the analysis of an asymmetry among nations that is distinct from heterogeneity
of types. Since the ability to invest is constrained by a nation’s wherewithal, a second
source of heterogeneity among nations is their diﬀering ability to invest. In Section 4, we
derive a number of results related to strategic investment choices. The political-economic
implications and interpretations are discussed in Section 5.1.
Feature (c) is intended to capture the view that national negotiators have incomplete
information, not only about environmental processes but also about the capabilities of
other nations. Technological innovations that allow the use of new resources, or the more
eﬃcient use of traditional resources, boost the size of private capital. Examples, just in the
energy industry, include the development of non-conventional energy sources and safer nu-
clear technology, new drilling techniques for deep-sea oil and gas exploration, more eﬃcient
use of coal for thermal energy and the improved capture of coal-bed methane. Equally,
new farming techniques, better water management systems and improved meteorologi-
cal forecasting will improve a nation’s ability to deal with environmental degradation, i.e.,
they will increase a nation’s adaptation capital. Given the value of patents for such innova-
tions, especially under an emission-capping regime, such technologies are not symmetrically
available to all nations. Moreover, the complex nature, secrecy and relatively small size of
innovative technology make it unlikely to be inferred accurately from commonly available
aggregative data. This asymmetry is important as bargainers at capping negotiations will
take into account not only their legacy of well-known technology that is embodied in the
commonly available data, but also their knowledge of emerging technologies at the margin.
4Features (d) and (e) are signiﬁcant innovations in the comparable literature. With
respect to (d), strategic manipulation of protocols has not been studied. With respect to
(e), other models treat the participating nations as unitary entities that choose emissions
and the emission caps, in eﬀect conﬂating the two variables and identifying the interests
of the entities choosing these variables.4
1.2 The literature
We now describe the theoretical literature on the regulation of international pollution
externalities paying particular attention to whether the model in question assumes: (®)
the existence of robust institutions for enforcing international contracts, (¯) that players
are symmetric, and (°) that players have complete information.
The cooperative game approach. While this literature employs a variety of solution
concepts, the approach using the core (Chander and Tulkens 1992, 1995, 1997) has yielded
the most striking general theoretical results. It characterizes a system of zero-sum transfers
for many-player emission allocation games that implements eﬃcient emission allocations
and satisﬁes individual and group rationality axioms.
This approach assumes that the members of a coalition of nations can correlate deci-
sions so as to maximize the sum of their utilities, thereby yielding the value of the coalition.
Thus, it implicitly relies on robust institutions for enforcing contracts among coalitions of
nations, as the assumed correlation of decisions cannot be guaranteed otherwise. While
this methodology has no problem dealing with heterogeneous players, the generalization of
cooperative solution concepts to incomplete information environments is very problematic.
Cooperative models implicitly make strong assumptions regarding the existence of
appropriate international institutions and consequently generate large improvements from
the status quo. Our non-cooperative model makes weak institutional assumptions, result-
ing in smaller improvement from the status quo. While the strength of the cooperative
approach is its normative attractiveness, the strength of the non-cooperative approach is
its descriptive plausibility.
The stable coalition approach. Studies such as Barrett (1994), Black et al. (1993) and
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) adopt a methodology initiated by d’Aspremont et al. (1983)
to study the likely size of a “stable coalition”.5 As this methodology does not slot readily
into either the cooperative or the non-cooperative game categories, we describe it in the
following abstract fashion.
Consider a game in strategic form given by data Γ, with N as the set of players. Given
Γ, we have the family of games fΓN0 j N0 ½ Ng, where ΓN0 is the game derived from Γ,
5with N0 acting as a coalition while the players in N ¡ N0 act as singletons. N0 being
a coalition means that the players in N0 act as a unit and distribute payoﬀs within the
coalition using some cooperative solution concept. Given a solution concept applicable to
the games in fΓN0 j N0 ½ Ng, let E(N0) denote an equilibrium proﬁle of payoﬀs for the
game ΓN0. A coalition N0 is said to be stable if: (a) E(N0)i ¸ E(N0 ¡ fig)i for every
i 2 N0, and (b) E(N0)i ¸ E(N0 [ fig)i for every i 2 N ¡ N0. (a) requires that no one
in N0 should want to defect unilaterally, while (b) requires that no one outside N0 should
want to join it unilaterally. Clearly, multiple equilibria create severe conceptual problems.
As shown in Tulkens (1998), this approach is not congruent with the cooperative
approach as it does not yield a characteristic function. However, a stable set can be
generated as the Nash equilibrium outcome of the following “metagame”. Consider a
treaty that determines the actions of all players who sign it. If i 2 N signs (denoted
by action ai = 1), i’s actions in Γ are chosen by the treaty, but otherwise (denoted by
action ai = 0) i acts as a singleton. A proﬁle of actions a = (ai)i2N generates a coalition
N(a) = fi 2 N j ai = 1g of players who have signed and a collection of singletons N¡N(a)
who have not signed. Thus, a proﬁle of actions a picks out the game ΓN(a). N0 is a stable
coalition if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium a of the metagame such that N0 = N(a).
This approach leans very heavily on assumptions (®), (¯) and (°). As in the cooper-
ative approach, (®) is intrinsic to this methodology as it is required to model the collusive
behavior of coalition N0 in the game ΓN0. Indeed, when the above structure is expanded
to allow transfers, (®) is strengthened substantially by allowing various sets of players to
“commit” to being “cooperative”. While some examples with heterogeneous players have
been studied, general results that allow player heterogeneity and incomplete information
are not known.
The cost-eﬀectiveness approach. This approach studies the implications of the postu-
late that nations will seek to implement pollution caps or abatement targets at minimum
abatement cost (Breton et al. 2004, Kaitala et al. 1993, Petrosjan and Zaccour 2003). If
a suﬃciently rich set of such strategies is available, then the determination of a proﬁle of
strategies to implement a given proﬁle of emission caps itself becomes a matter of strategic
analysis.
While this approach can explain how a given proﬁle of emission caps may be imple-
mented, it cannot serve our agenda in this paper, which is to generate a theory of how
the emission caps are arrived at in the ﬁrst place. This is because abatement costs do not
capture fully the costs and beneﬁts from emissions. However, in the spirit of “perfection”,
6the use of equilibrium cost minimizing strategies after emission rights are awarded should
be anticipated and taken into account when the emission rights are allocated. This reﬁne-
ment does not create diﬃculties in the model analyzed in the main body of this paper as
the range of implementation options modelled by us is very limited: the only way for a
country to implement an emission cap in our model is to cut domestic emission.
Non-cooperative multi-period approach. A fourth set of studies considers multi-period
games in which each nation chooses how much to emit in every period. The formal frame-
work can be a repeated game, in which the stage-game in every period is identical, or
a dynamic game such as a diﬀerential or stochastic game, in which the stage-game is
parametrized by an endogenously-determined time-varying state variable. Although this
literature does not model regulatory interventions via quantitative restrictions on emis-
sions, it does allow for regulation via international ﬁscal incentives. Even in the absence
of ﬁscal incentives, the existence of a future in a multi-period game can sustain implicit
agreements in equilibrium, with penal codes (e.g., “grim trigger”, “tit-for-tat”, “carrot-
and-stick”) providing appropriate incentives. Two main issues are considered in this lit-
erature (e.g., Hoel 1993, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992, Cesar 1994, Dockner and van
Long 1993, Martin et al. 1993): (1) the extent to which implicit cooperation can be induced
in equilibrium, and (2) the extent to which international ﬁscal incentives can be used to
inﬂuence the equilibrium.
The literature addressing (1) applies the so-called folk theorems of game theory; while
an array of such theorems are known for repeated games for a variety of equilibrium con-
cepts, there do not appear to be very general analogous results for dynamic games. With
respect to (2), although ﬁscal incentives are a standard method of correcting distortions
caused by externalities, the application of ﬁscal tools across nations requires various facil-
itating international institutions. While this approach does not require assumption (¯), it
does rely on assumption (°).
1.3 Outline of the paper and results
In Section 2.1, we formally state our three stage model. As is standard, the model is
solved backwards. Accordingly, Stages 3, 2 and 1 of the model are studied in Sections 2.2,
2.3 and 2.4 respectively. The equilibrium of the entire model is deﬁned in Section 2.5.
In Section 3, we analyze the outcomes of Stage 2 and derive the comparative statics
results that link the stationary points of the bargaining process to the underlying data
of the model. We use these results in Section 4 to derive the properties of equilibrium
7behavior in Stage 1. We conclude in Section 5 with an interpretation of our results and
suggestions for interesting extensions. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Other than the results related to the theory of emission caps determination analyzed
in Section 2.3, we derive two classes of substantive results. First, we derive general compar-
ative statics results (Proposition 3.1.5) that show the systematic and easily interpretable
dependence of the emission caps (i.e., the stationary points of the negotiation process) on
the underlying data consisting of national types. Secondly, we use the comparative statics
results to show (Propositions 4.2.7, 4.2.8, 4.3.4, 4.3.6, 4.4.1) how equilibrium investment
choices in Stage 1 are used to manipulate the equilibrium emission caps. As we show,
the qualitative and quantitative properties of the manipulations that a nation implements
depend systematically on factors such as the nature of technology, the initial endowment




Let N be the set of nations with jNj = n. Nation i’s type space is Θ = <2
+ and the
space of type proﬁles is Θn. ¸i 2 P(Θ) is the common knowledge distribution of Nation
i’s initial type ¯ µi. Let ¸¡i =
Q
j2N¡fig ¸j be Nation i’s belief about the initial types of
the other nations.
Nation i consists of Firm i and Consumer i. Nation i’s initial type is a pair (¯ ti;¯ ki) =
¯ µi 2 Θ, where ¯ ti is Firm i’s private capital and ¯ ki is Consumer i’s adaptation capital. As
per the usual interpretation of “type”, ¯ µi is Nation (and Firm) i’s private information.
The play of the game proceeds as follows. After Nature picks a proﬁle of initial
types ¯ µ = (¯ µj)j2N 2 Θn, the game has three stages: (1) investment, (2) capping, and (3)
production. While the sequencing of stages is important, the passage of time per se is
ignored; consequently, there is no time-discounting.
In Stage 1, the nations simultaneously modify their initial types by investing: if Nation
i invests Ii 2 Θ, then its type is modiﬁed from ¯ µi to ¯ µi + Ii. The proﬁle of investments
I = (Ij)j2N 2 Θn chosen in Stage 1 is common knowledge in Stage 2. In Section 4, we
shall consider a number of variations of this stage, depending on whether Nation i or Firm
i chooses Ii and bears the resulting cost.
In Stage 2, with Nation i knowing ¯ µi and I, the nations negotiate to determine the
emission caps to be allocated to the various nations. We model the negotiations formally
8using the best response dynamic procedure and postulate that the implemented proﬁle of
caps, e 2 ¯ <n
+, is a stationary point of this dynamic procedure. In Section 2.3, we show
that the set of stationary points of the dynamic process is identical to the set of Nash
equilibria of a complete information game denoted G(¯ µ;I), where ¯ µ = (¯ µj)j2N. Given this
characterization, the existence of stationary points is easy to demonstrate using Nash’s
existence theorem (see Moulin 1986). Moreover, this characterization is exploited in Sec-
tions 3 and 4 to derive the substantive results of this paper. There are additional reasons
for seeing the stationary points as compelling predictions of the negotiations. We will
provide a simple condition to supplement our primitive assumptions that will ensure that
G(¯ µ;I) is dominance-solvable. This will guarantee the existence of a unique Nash equi-
librium of G(¯ µ;I), and therefore, a unique stationary point of the best response dynamic
process. Consequently, the steady-state solution of the dynamical system corresponding to
the unique stationary point is globally asymptotically stable: starting from any proposed
proﬁle of caps, the dynamic process will drive the proposed proﬁles of caps towards the
unique stationary proﬁle.
In Stage 3, Firm i knows ¯ µi, I and e, and chooses variable input vi, which determines
Firm (and Nation) i’s proﬁt and emission.The proﬁle of emissions by all the nations de-
termine the damage suﬀered by Consumer (and Nation) i. The choice of vi is subject to
the constraint that the resulting emission cannot exceed Nation i’s cap ei.
Suppose Nation i’s modiﬁed type is µi = (ti;ki). If Firm i employs variable input
vi, then Firm (and Nation) i’s proﬁt is g(ti;vi) and its emission is h(ti;vi) · ei; g and
h are to be interpreted as incorporating the eﬀects of domestic regulations, e.g., emission
taxes and subsidies for adoption of clean technologies, other than the quantity-rationing
implied by the emission rights regime. The resulting total world emission
P
j2N h(tj;vj)
is consumed by the consumer of every nation and this causes damage ±(ki;
P
j2N h(tj;vj))
to Consumer (and Nation) i.
2.2 Stage 3: properties of optimal action and value functions
Suppose the proﬁle of modiﬁed types is µ and the proﬁle of emission caps is e. Given
this data, we analyze Firm i’s decision-making assuming that it maximizes its proﬁt.
Assumption 2.2.1. g : <2
+ ! <+ and h : <2
+ ! <+ are continuous functions such that,
for every t 2 <+,
(a) g(t;:) has a unique maximum at V (t) where V : <+ ! <++ is continuous,
9(b) g(t;:) is strictly increasing on [0;V (t)] and strictly concave on <+, and
(c) h(t;0) = 0 and h(t;:) is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
(a) and (b) imply that proﬁt increases with variable input until the unconstrained
maximum is attained and use of the variable input faces diminishing returns. (c) implies
that emission increases at an increasing rate with the variable input.
Consider a ﬁrm with modiﬁed private capital by t 2 <+ and emission cap e 2 ¯ <+.
The ﬁrm’s problem is to choose variable input v to maximize proﬁt g(t;v) subject to
the constraint h(t;v) · e. Since V (t) is an unconstrained optimal choice for the ﬁrm and
h(t;:) is increasing, the ﬁrm’s constraint can be written as v 2 Γ(t;e) ´ fv 2 <+ j h(t;v) ·
eg \ [0;V (t)].
Let v : <+ £ ¯ <+ ! <+ be such that, for every (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+, v(t;e) solves the
ﬁrm’s problem; consequently, for every (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+, we have h(t;v(t;e)) · e. Deﬁne
f : <+ £ ¯ <+ ! < by f(t;e) = g(t;v(t;e)). Consequently, Firm i’s choice of variable input
is v(ti;ei), its proﬁt is f(ti;ei) and its emission is h(ti;v(ti;ei)). The next result records
some consequences of the above structure.
Proposition 2.2.2. Given Assumption 2.2.1,
(A) for every (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+ there exists a unique v(t;e) 2 Γ(t;e) such that
g(t;v(t;e)) ¸ g(t;v) for every v 2 Γ(t;e), and
(B) v : <+ £ ¯ <+ ! <+ and f : <+ £ ¯ <+ ! < are continuous functions.
Moreover, for every (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+,
(C) e ¸ h(t;V (t)) if and only if v(t;e) = V (t), and
(D) e · h(t;V (t)) if and only if h(t;v(t;e)) = e.
Furthermore, for every t 2 <+,
(E) f(t;:) is strictly increasing on [0;h(t;V (t))],
(F) f(t;:) is strictly concave on [0;h(t;V (t))], and
(G) f(t;e) = g(t;V (t)) for e ¸ h(t;V (t)).
V (t) may be interpreted as the status quo, i.e., prior to emission capping, level of vari-
able input use. Therefore, g(t;V (t)) and h(t;V (t)) are the status quo proﬁt and emission.
Thus, a cap e is a binding constraint on the ﬁrm if and only if e · h(t;V (t)). Given our
interpretation of V (t), the above results have straightforward interpretations.
2.3 Stage 2: existence, uniqueness and stability of stationary points
Suppose the proﬁle of initial types is ¯ µ and the proﬁle of investments in Stage 1 is I,
resulting in the proﬁle of modiﬁed types µ = ¯ µ + I = (tj;kj)j2N. Suppose the proﬁle of
10emission caps e = (ej)j2N 2 ¯ <n
+ is proposed publicly by an uninformed mediator, i.e., one
who is not privy to the types of the various nations. The nations inform the mediator about
their best response to the proposed proﬁle. The best responses are used as the proposals for
the next round and the procedure carries on iteratively. A stationary point of this procedure
is the ﬁnally implemented proﬁle of caps.
To ease analysis, we enrich Assumption 2.2.1 as follows. Henceforth, a function being
Cp means it is p times continuously diﬀerentiable on the speciﬁed set.
Assumption 2.3.1. In addition to the requirements of Assumption 2.2.1, suppose that,
(a) for every t 2 <+, g(t;:) and h(t;:) are C1 on <++, and
(b) for every k 2 <+, ±(k;:) is continuous, C1 on <++, strictly increasing and strictly
convex.
The smoothness assumptions are for made to obtain simple characterizations. (b) also
assumes that damage increases at an increasing rate with respect to total emission. We
note some consequences.
Proposition 2.3.2. Given Assumption 2.3.1 and t 2 <+,
(A) Dvg(t;V (t)) = 0,
(B) Dev(t;e) = 0 and Dvg(t;v(t;e)) = 0 for e > h(t;V (t)),
(C) v(t;:) is C1 on (0;h(t;V (t))), and
(D) g(t;v(t;:)) is C1 on (0;h(t;V (t))) [ (h(t;V (t));1).
Description of dynamic negotiation procedure. Suppose a proﬁle of caps e 2 ¯ <n
+ is
proposed. Given e, we say that Nation i accepts ei if there is no alternative cap for i that
is preferred to ei, assuming that the caps e¡i will be implemented by the other nations.
Since caps cannot be imposed exogenously on sovereign nations, assuming that the other
nations will implement e¡i amounts to assuming that every Nation j 2 N ¡ fig accepts
ej given e.
Let Λi(I;e¡i) be Nation i’s belief about µ¡i, conditional on (a) private information
µi, (b) public information I, and (c) the assumption that the other nations accept the caps













11The equal weights we have given to the national ﬁrm and the national consumer in speci-
fying Ui are just a matter of notational convenience; specifying other weights will increase
the number of model parameters but not aﬀect the nature of our results. The set of Nation




fb 2 ¯ <+ j Ui(µi;I;b;e¡i) ¸ Ui(µi;I;x;e¡i)g
We require that a proposal e be implemented only if it is accepted by all nations, i.e.,
ej 2 ¯j(e¡j;µj;I) for every j 2 N. As there is no guarantee that an uninformed mediator
will pick a proposal e that all nations will accept, we require that the mediator make
fresh proposals until one is accepted by all nations. A new proposal is generated from the
current one by using the best response dynamic:
ej(¿ + 1) = ¯j(e¡j(¿);µj;I) (2:3:4)
for j 2 N and ¿ 2 N, where ¿ represents time.6 We say that e 2 ¯ <n
+ is a stationary point
of (2.3.4), given (µ;I) 2 Θn £ Θn, if ej = ¯j(e¡j;µj;I) for every j 2 N.
Characterization of best response mapping. We begin our analysis of (2.3.4) by charac-
terizing Nation j’s best responses to a given proposal e. In principle, it seems possible that
h(tj;v(tj;b)) < b for some b 2 ¯j(e¡j;µj;I), i.e., Nation j’s actual emission given a best
response cap might be less than the cap. This divergence can complicate the analysis of
emission capping as the costs and beneﬁts of capping are generated by the actual emissions
that result from capping, rather than the caps per se. The following result eliminates this
potential problem.
Proposition 2.3.5. Given Assumption 2.3.1, j 2 N, (tj;kj) = µj 2 Θ and e 2 ¯ <n
+, if
b 2 ¯j(e¡j;µj;I), then h(tj;v(tj;b)) = b < h(tj;V (tj)).
We immediately have the following consequences.
Corollary 2.3.6. Nation i’s belief that the other nations will accept the caps e¡i amounts
to believing, almost surely, that ej 2 ¯j(e¡j;µj;I) for every j 2 N ¡fig. Thus, for almost
every (tj;kj)j2N¡fig 2 suppΛi(I;e¡i) and for every j 2 N ¡ fig, h(tj;v(tj;ej)) = ej <
h(tj;V (tj)). This simpliﬁes (2.3.3) to


























; if ei > h(ti;V (ti))
(2:3:8)




fb 2 ¯ <+ j ui(µi;b;e¡i) ¸ ui(µi;x;e¡i)g ½ [0;h(ti;V (ti))) (2:3:10)
Combining (2.3.8), Proposition 2.2.2(F) and Assumption 2.3.1(b), ui(µi;:;e¡i) is strictly
concave on [0;h(ti;V (ti))]. Therefore, Nation i’s best response is unique, i.e., ¯i(:;µi;I) is
a function, which justiﬁes formula (2.3.4). As ui depends only on Nation i’s modiﬁed type
µi, and not directly on I, we may replace ¯i(e¡i;µi;I) by ¯i(e¡i;µi) in (2.3.4).
Corollary 2.3.11. If e is a stationary point of (2.3.4), then ej < h(tj;V (tj)) for every
j 2 N, i.e., in equilibrium, every nation accepts to cap its emission strictly below the level
that the domestic ﬁrm would choose in the absence of capping.
Thus, Proposition 2.3.5 has a number of useful implications. First, it reduces the num-
ber of variables involved in the analysis of an equilibrium by identifying equilibrium caps
with equilibrium emissions. Secondly, the complicated expected damage term in (2.3.3) is
simpliﬁed to the damage term in (2.3.7). This is a vital simpliﬁcation as it ensures that
the private values assumption is satisﬁed when equilibrium caps are identiﬁed. Thirdly,
Nation i’s payoﬀ in the relevant range [0;h(ti;V (ti))] is not monotonically increasing with
respect to ei, for a larger cap in this range induces greater emission by Firm i, thereby
increasing Firm i’s proﬁt, but also increasing Consumer i’s damage. Thus, by attaching
an endogenously generated shadow value to emission rights in the form of damages, our
model forces nations to trade-oﬀ proﬁts against damages, thereby preventing them from
pursuing arbitrarily large caps. Consequently, results in Section 4 asserting that a nation
manipulates its type to increase its emission cap do not reﬂect a trivial desire to have an
arbitrarily large amount of a free positive-valued option, but a desire to have a speciﬁc
larger cap for strategic reasons.
Existence, uniqueness and stability of stationary points. Given µ = (µj)j2N 2 Θn,
where µj = (tj;kj) is Nation j’s modiﬁed type, deﬁne the non-cooperative game
G(µ) = fN;([0;h(tj;V (tj))];uj(µj;:))j2Ng (2:3:12)
where N is the set of players, [0;h(tj;V (tj))] is player j’s strategy space and uj(µj;:) :
Q
r2N[0;h(tr;V (tr))] ! < is player j’s payoﬀ function.
13Proposition 2.3.13. Given µ 2 Θn, e¤ is a stationary point of (2.3.4) if and only if e¤ is
a Nash equilibrium of G(µ).
Needless to say, this result neither assumes nor implies that the nations are playing
G(µ) in Stage 2. However, the characterization is very useful as it allows the application of
many standard results; e.g., an application of Nash’s existence theorem yields the following.
Proposition 2.3.14. Given Assumption 2.3.1 and µ 2 Θn,
(A) there exists a stationary point of (2.3.4), and
(B) if e is a stationary point of (2.3.4), then e 2
Q
j2N[0;h(tj;V (tj))).
Theorem 3 in Moulin (1986) implies the following strong result.
Proposition 2.3.15. If Assumption 2.3.1 is satisﬁed and
¡Deef(tj;ej) > (n ¡ 2)De+e+±(ki;e+) (2:3:16)
for every j 2 N and e 2
Q
j2N[0;h(tj;V (tj))], then G(µ) is dominance-solvable and has a
unique Nash equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable with respect to (2.3.4).
Combining this result with Proposition 2.3.13, we have
Corollary 2.3.17. Given the assumptions of Proposition 2.3.15, (2.3.4) has a unique
stationary point that is globally asymptotically stable.
Thus, given appropriate assumptions, the postulated negotiation process converges
to the same stationary point, independent of the initial proposed proﬁle. For n = 2,
Assumption 2.3.1 implies that (2.3.16) holds trivially, and therefore the conclusions of
Corollary 2.3.17 hold automatically. (2.3.16) becomes easier to satisfy as (a) n decreases,
(b) the curvature of f increases, and (c) the curvature of ± decreases.
Welfare properties of stationary points. Proposition 2.3.14(B) implies that e ¿
(h(tj;V (tj)))j2N for every stationary point e of (2.3.4). Compared to the status quo,
every consumer is better oﬀ and every ﬁrm is worse oﬀ. From the perspective of the na-
tions, the stationary point represents a Pareto improvement over the status quo. Indeed,
the stationary proﬁle is Pareto superior to every intermediate proﬁle also.
Proposition 2.3.18. Suppose Assumption 2.3.1 is satisﬁed. If e is a stationary point of
(2.3.4) and z 2
Q
j2N[ej;h(tj;V (tj))] ¡ feg, then ui(µi;z) < ui(µi;e) for every i 2 N.
2.4 Stage 1: deﬁnition of equilibrium investment choices
14Suppose it is anticipated that the emission caps accepted in Stage 2 will be generated
by a function (¯ µ;µ) 7! e(¯ µ;µ) 2 ¯ <n
+, where ¯ µ 2 Θn is the proﬁle of initial types and µ is
the proﬁle of modiﬁed types. I = µ ¡ ¯ µ is the proﬁle of investments. Let investment Ii cost
C(Ii) to Nation i.
If the proﬁle of initial types is ¯ µ and the proﬁle of Stage 1 investments is I, then
Nation i’s payoﬀ is ui(¯ µi + Ii;e(¯ µ; ¯ µ + I)) ¡ C(Ii), where the ﬁrst term is given by (2.3.8);
indeed, if e(¯ µ; ¯ µ + I) is a stationary point, then Corollary 2.3.11 implies that the ﬁrst line
of (2.3.8) applies. We assume that the proﬁle of investments is generated by a Bayesian
equilibrium (¾i)i2N, where Nation i’s strategy ¾i : Θ ! Θ is such that, for every ¯ µi 2 Θ,
Ii = ¾i(¯ µi) maximizes
Z
Θn¡1
¸¡i(d¯ µ¡i)ui(¯ µi + Ii;e(¯ µi; ¯ µ¡i; ¯ µi + Ii; ¯ µ¡i + ¾¡i(¯ µ¡i))) ¡ C(Ii) (2:4:1)
Rational behavior in this environment amounts to being a Bayesian decision-maker, i.e.,
every nation should maximize its subjective expected payoﬀ conditional on its type and
some belief regarding the decisions of the other nations, or equivalently as in (2.4.1), some
belief about the types and strategies of the other nations. In addition to rationality, a
Bayesian equilibrium requires the proﬁle of beliefs and strategies to be consistent, i.e.,
the subjective belief of every nation should be justiﬁed by the actual strategies of the
other nations. We shall be content to characterize Bayesian equilibrium strategies without
attempting to prove the existence of such an equilibrium.
2.5 Equilibrium
We now pull together the discussion of Sections 2.1 to 2.4 in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.5.1. f(¾i)i2N;e;vg is an equilibrium if it satisﬁes the following properties.
(a) v : <+ £ ¯ <+ ! <+ is such that, for every (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+, v = v(t;e) maximizes
g(t;v) subject to the constraint h(t;v) · e.
(b) e : Θn £ Θn ! <n
+ is such that, for every j 2 N and every (¯ µ;µ) 2 Θn £ Θn,
ej = ej(¯ µ;µ) maximizes uj(µj;e¡j(¯ µ;µ);ej).
(c) for every i 2 N, ¾i : Θ ! Θ is such that ¾i(¯ µi) maximizes (2.4.1) for every ¯ µi 2 Θ.
3. Analysis of Stage 2 outcomes
3.1 Comparative statics
15In this section we analyze the properties of the mapping e : Θ2 £ Θ2 ! <2
+ that
describes stationary cap proﬁles. We simplify notation in this section by suppressing the
proﬁle of initial types ¯ µ; thus, e(¯ µ;µ) is abbreviated to e(µ). Moreover, using Proposition
2.3.5, e(µ) may be referred to as the proﬁle of emissions (identical to the proﬁle of emission
caps) when the proﬁle of modiﬁed types is µ. Naturally, variations in the modiﬁed type µi
reﬂect one-for-one the variations of the investments Ii. This analysis requires assumptions
regarding the eﬀects of type variations on emission, proﬁt and damage.
Assumption 3.1.1. In addition to Assumption 2.3.1 and (2.3.16), assume that
(a) for every v 2 <+, g(:;v) is strictly increasing and h(:;v) is strictly decreasing,
(b) for every e 2 <+, f(:;e) is strictly concave,
(c) g and h are C3 and ± is C2 on <2
++.
(d) Dke+± < 0, and
(e) for every e+ 2 <+, ±(:;e+) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex.
(a) implies that proﬁt is increasing and emission is decreasing with respect to private
capital. (b) implies that private capital faces diminishing returns. (d) implies that greater
adaptation capital reduces a nation’s vulnerability to damage. (e) means that a nation’s
damage decreases with adaptation capital but this beneﬁcial eﬀect is subject to diminishing
returns. We note the following consequences of these assumptions.
Proposition 3.1.2. Given Assumption 3.1.1,
(A) v and f are C2 on f(t;e) 2 <2
++ j e < h(t;V (t))g,
(B) given e;t;t0 2 <+, if t < t0, e · h(t;V (t)) and e · h(t0;V (t0)), then f(t;e) <
f(t0;e), and
(C) ui is C2 at (µi;e) 2 <4
++ such that ei < h(ti(µi);V ± ti(µi)).
Let j 2 N and µ 2 ΘN. By Deﬁnition 2.5.1(b), ej = ej(µ) maximizes uj(µj;ej;e¡j(µ)).
Proposition 2.3.5 implies ej(µ) < h(tj(µ);V ±tj(µ)). Therefore, Proposition 3.1.2(C) implies
that uj(µj;:;e¡j(µ)) is C2 at ej(µ). Thus, we have the ﬁrst order condition for every j 2 N:
Dejuj(µj;e(µ)) = 0 (3:1:3)
Dejuj(µj;e(µ)) is the shadow value of emission rights to Nation j of type µj when the
emission cap proﬁle is e(µ). Thus, (3.1.3) means that, in equilibrium, the shadow value of
emission rights for every nation is equal to the cost of acquiring the marginal right, which
is zero. Analogously, Def(tj;ej) is the shadow value of emission rights to Firm j with
16private capital tj when Nation j’s emission cap is ej. It follows from Proposition 2.2.2
that the ﬁrm’s shadow value of emission rights is positive in equilibrium. Thus, ceteris
paribus, the national ﬁrm will prefer a larger cap than the equilibrium one negotiated by
the national government. This divergence of interests will explain diﬀerences between the
socialist and capitalist cases considered in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
Combining Propositions 2.2.2(F) and 3.1.2(A) with Assumptions 3.1.1(c) and 2.3.1(b)
implies the second order condition
Dejejuj(µj;e(µ)) < 0 (3:1:4)
for every j 2 N. The eﬀects on e(µ) of varying either component of µ1 are as follows; with
appropriate notational adjustments, the same result holds for all nations.
Proposition 3.1.5. Given Assumption 3.1.1, and interpreting x as either t1 or k1,
(A) Sign Dxej = ¡Sign De1xu1 for j 2 N ¡ f1g,
(B) Sign Dxe1 = Sign De1xu1, and
(C) Sign Dx
P
j2N ej = Sign De1xu1.
Evidently, the signs of all the variational formulae depend on how the type variations
aﬀect the shadow values of emission rights for the nation whose type is being perturbed.
3.2 Applications
We set N = f1;2g in the following applications. As should be clear from the proofs
and Proposition 3.1.5, these results apply to any pair of nations in N. The following
deﬁnition classiﬁes technology as locally clean (resp. dirty) if the ﬁrm’s shadow value of
emission rights decreases (resp. increases) with increases in private capital.
Deﬁnition 3.2.1. Technology f is dirty (resp. clean) at (t0;e0) if Dtef(t0;e0) > 0 (resp.
Dtef(t0;e0) < 0).
Corollary 3.2.2. Let N = f1;2g and µ = ((t1;k1);(t2;k2)). Given e(µ) = (e1(µ);e2(µ)),
let e¡(µ) = e1(µ) ¡ e2(µ).
(A) If Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) < 0, then Dt1e1(µ) < 0, Dt1e2(µ) > 0, Dt1e+(µ) < 0 and
Dt1e¡(µ) < 0.
(B) If Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0, then Dt1e1(µ) > 0, Dt1e2(µ) < 0, Dt1e+(µ) > 0 and
Dt1e¡(µ) > 0.
(C) Dk1e1(µ) > 0, Dk1e2(µ) < 0 and Dk1e+(µ) > 0.
17(A) (resp. (B)) means that the growth of private capital in a clean (resp. dirty) nation
implies lower (resp. higher) domestic emission, higher (resp. lower) foreign emission, lower
(resp. higher) aggregate emission, and assuming e¡(µ) > 0, convergence (resp. divergence)
of national emissions. (C) means that the growth of adaptation capital implies higher
domestic emission, lower foreign emission and higher aggregate emission. We next derive
the ordering of emission caps implied by the ordering of adaptation capital.
Corollary 3.2.3. If N = f1;2g, µ = ((t;k1);(t;k2)) and k1 > k2, then e1(µ) > e2(µ).
Ceteris paribus, nations with more adaptation capital have larger emissions. In the
case of private capital, the analogous result is more complicated as the nature of technology
aﬀects the directions in which the emissions change as private capital varies.
Corollary 3.2.4. If N = f1;2g, and
(a) µ = ((t1;k);(t2;k)) and t1 > t2,
(b) Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0 and Dtef(t2;e2(µ)) > 0 (resp. Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) < 0 and
Dtef(t2;e2(µ)) < 0), and
(c) for every e0, Dtef(:;e0) is decreasing,
then e1(µ) > e2(µ) (resp. e1(µ) < e2(µ)).
If (a) both nations have the same adaptation capital stock, (b) both nations have clean
(resp. dirty) technology, and (c) technology becomes cleaner as private capital grows, then
the nation with the greater private capital stock has lower (resp. higher) emission.
4. Analysis of Stage 1 choices
4.1 Set-up
In this section we analyze Nation 1’s choices in Stage 1. In Section 4.2, we consider the
“socialist” case: investment in Nation 1’s private and adaptation capital is chosen by the
government. In Section 4.3, we consider the “capitalist” case: Firm 1 chooses investment
in Nation 1’s private and adaptation capital. In Section 4.4, we consider the “global” case
when Nation 1 or Firm 1 can choose foreign adaptation and private capital. It is also possi-
ble to consider the mixed economy case when the government chooses Nation 1’s domestic
adaptation capital while Firm 1 chooses domestic private capital. Since these decision-
makers have diﬀerent objectives, their joint decisions have to conform to some notion of
equilibrium. The joint decisions can be modelled using Nash equilibrium as the solution
18concept. However, we do not present the details here as the results qualitatively mimic
those of Sections 4.2 and 4.3, and the analysis does not throw up any new phenomena.
Let f(¾i)i2N;e;vg satisfy Deﬁnition 2.5.1. We studied v in Section 2.2, and e in
Sections 2.3 and 3. Finally, we study (¾i)i2N to derive the motives guiding the investments
in Stage 1. It suﬃces to study the decision-making of just one nation, say Nation 1, as
the same arguments apply to every nation. For notational and expositional simplicity, we
study a special case of our model.
Assumption 4.1.1. The special model is speciﬁed by the following assumptions:
(a) N = f1;2g,
(b) ¯ µ1 ´ 0 2 <2, and
(c) C(x;y) = x + y.
By Proposition 3.1.5(A), the directional eﬀect of Nation 1’s Stage 1 choice on the
equilibrium Stage 2 outcomes is identical across the other nations. Given that the results
in this section rely only on this directional eﬀect, we may replace N ¡ f1g with a repre-
sentative Nation 2 without loss of generality, as we do in Assumption (a). Assumption (b)
is a change-of-origin so that we can ignore non-negativity constraints that would result
from positive initial levels of private and adaptation capital and an inability to choose
smaller levels by disinvesting. As ¯ µ1 ´ 0, we lighten notation by eliminating it from our
expressions. Assumption (c) allows investment to move without friction between private
and adaptation capital. Our piecemeal analysis of investment decisions is without loss of
generality because the cost of investments is linear and additive. This allows us to focus
on the strategic role of these investments.
Assumption 4.1.2. f(¾i)i2N;e;vg is an equilibrium of the special model such that
(a) ¾1(0) = (t1;k1) À 0, and
(b) e(¯ µ2;I1; ¯ µ2 + I2) 2 <2
++ for (¯ µ2;I1; ¯ µ2 + I2) 2 Θ £ Θ2.
4.2 The socialist case
If Nation 1’s investment is I1 = (t1;k1) and Nation 2’s type is ¯ µ2, then Nation 1’s
payoﬀ is u1(I1;e(¯ µ2;I1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2))) ¡ C(I1). Consequently, Nation 1’s Stage 1 problem
is: choose I1 = (t1;k1) 2 Θ to maximize
Z
Θ
¸2(d¯ µ2)u1(I1;e(¯ µ2;I1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2))) ¡ C(I1) (4:2:1)
19Let e : Θ2 £Θ2 ! <2
+ be such that, for every (¯ µ;µ) 2 Θ2 £Θ2, e(¯ µ;µ) is accepted by both
nations. Given e, let I1 solve (4.2.1). Let I0




1;e(¯ µ2;I1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2))) ¡ C(I0
1) (4:2:2)
Clearly, Nation i prefers µ0
1 to µ1 ex post. The diﬀerence between µ0
1 and µ1 represents
Nation 1’s ability to manipulate the choice of caps in Stage 2 by aﬀecting the choice of the
Stage 2 continuation game via its Stage 1 choice of investment.
Let (t¤;k¤) À (0;0) solve (4.2.1). Simplify notation by denoting e(¯ µ2;t¤;k¤; ¯ µ2 +





















First consider the choice of adaptation capital. Combining Assumption 2.2.1, Propo-
sition 2.2.3(A) and Corollary 3.2.2(C), the beneﬁts of investment in adaptation capital are:
(a) an increase in domestic proﬁt caused by higher domestic emission, (b) lower domestic
vulnerability to damage, and (c) a decrease in domestic damage on account of lower foreign
emission. The costs are: (d) an increase in domestic damage caused by higher domestic
emission, and (e) the opportunity cost of investment. In equilibrium, each nation’s emis-
sion (cap) is chosen to balance beneﬁt (a) and cost (d) at the margin. Thus, (4.2.4) ensures
that marginal beneﬁts (b) and (c) are balanced by the marginal cost (e). (b) is the direct
beneﬁt of investment in adaptation capital, while (c) is the indirect or strategic beneﬁt.
Let (t0;k0) be Nation 1’s choice of private and adaptation capital given the type









+(¯ µ2)) = ¡1 (4:2:6)
k¤ > k0 (resp. k¤ < k0) is interpreted as strategic overinvestment (resp. underinvestment)

























+(¯ µ2)) < 0. Assumption 3.1.1(e) implies k0 < k¤.
Proposition 4.2.7. Nation 1 overinvests in domestic adaptation capital, thereby strate-
gically raising e1, lowering e2 and raising e+.
Now consider the choice of private capital. t¤ > t0 (resp. t¤ < t0) is interpreted as
strategic overinvestment (resp. underinvestment) by Nation 1 in domestic private capital.
Proposition 4.2.8. If Dtef(t¤;e¤
1(¯ µ2)) < 0 (resp. Dtef(t¤;e¤
1(¯ µ2)) > 0) for every ¯ µ2 2
supp¸2, then Nation 1 underinvests (resp. overinvests) in domestic private capital, thereby
strategically raising e1, lowering e2 and raising e+.
Proof. Suppose Dtef(t¤;e¤
1(¯ µ2)) < 0 for every ¯ µ2 2 supp¸2. Then, (4.2.3), (4.2.5), As-

























1(¯ µ2)) < 0. Assumption 3.1.1(b) implies t0 > t¤. The other
case is analogous.
Since, in equilibrium, e1 is a best response to e2 in terms of Nation 1’s preference, we
have the following observation.
Remark 4.2.9. Nation 1’s strategic manipulations (see (4.2.3) and (4.2.4)) in Proposi-
tions 4.2.7 and 4.2.8 work by manipulating downwards Nation 2’s emission.
4.3 The capitalist case
Suppose Firm 1 chooses investment I1 = (t1;k1). If Firm 1’s investment is (t1;k1)
and Nation 2’s type is ¯ µ2, then Firm 1’s payoﬀ is f(t1;e1(¯ µ2;t1;k1; ¯ µ2 +¾2(¯ µ2)))¡t1 ¡k1.
Assuming Nation 1 and Firm 1 have identical information, Firm 1’s Stage 1 problem is:
choose (t1;k1) 2 Θ to maximize
Z
Θ
¸2(d¯ µ2)f(t1;e1(¯ µ2;t1;k1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2))) ¡ t1 ¡ k1 (4:3:1)
Let (t1;k1) = (t¤¤;k¤¤) À (0;0) maximize (4.3.1). We simplify notation by writing




1 (¯ µ2)) + Def(t¤¤;e¤¤
1 (¯ µ2))Dte¤¤





1 (¯ µ2) = 1 (4:3:3)
21Let (t00;k00) be Firm 1’s choice of private and adaptation capital given the type contingent
emissions ¯ µ2 7! e¤¤(¯ µ2). k¤¤ > k00 (resp. k¤¤ < k00) indicates overinvestment (resp.
underinvestment) in adaptation capital. Similarly, t¤¤ > t00 (resp. t¤¤ < t00) indicates
overinvestment (resp. underinvestment) in private capital. Clearly, k00 = 0. Therefore,
k¤¤ > 0 represents overinvestment by Firm 1 in adaptation capital. Copying the proofs of
Propositions 4.2.7 and 4.2.8, we have
Proposition 4.3.4. Propositions 4.2.7 and 4.2.8 hold with “Firm 1” replacing “Nation
1”.
Nation 1’s equilibrium emission is a best response to foreign emission, arrived at
by balancing domestic proﬁt considerations against domestic damage considerations. As
Firm 1 does not take domestic damage into account, Nation 1’s equilibrium emission is
sub-optimal from Firm 1’s perspective. Moreover, unlike Nation 1, Firm 1 is indiﬀerent to
foreign emission. This leads to the following observation, which may be contrasted with
Remark 4.2.9.
Remark 4.3.5. Firm 1’s strategic manipulations (see (4.3.2) and (4.3.3)) in Proposition
4.3.4 work by manipulating upwards Nation 1’s emission.
We now ask: in what directions would Nation 1 like to perturb Firm 1’s choice
(t¤¤;k¤¤)? Let G(t1;k1) =
R
Θ ¸2(d¯ µ2)u1(t1;k1;e(¯ µ2;t1;k1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2))) ¡ t1 ¡ k1. (4.3.2)




+ (¯ µ2). Therefore, As-
sumption 2.3.1(b) and Corollary 3.2.2 imply
Proposition 4.3.6. If Dtef(t¤¤;e¤¤
1 (¯ µ2)) < 0 (resp. Dtef(t¤¤;e¤¤
1 (¯ µ2)) > 0) for every
¯ µ2 2 supp¸2, then Nation 1 prefers a higher (resp. lower) level of private capital than
Firm 1.
(4.3.3) implies that Nation 1’s incentive for marginal domestic adaptation invest-
ment is DkG(t¤¤;k¤¤) = ¡
R
Θ ¸2(d¯ µ2)[Dk±(k¤¤;e¤¤
+ (¯ µ2)) + De+±(k¤¤;e¤¤
+ (¯ µ2))Dke¤¤
+ (¯ µ2)].
Assumptions 2.3.1(b) and 3.1.1(e), and Corollary 3.2.2(C), imply that this marginal in-
centive cannot be signed unambiguously as an increase in Nation 1’s adaptation capital
has two opposing eﬀects on Nation 1’s damage. On the one hand, it directly decreases
domestic damage (the direct eﬀect), but on the other hand, it increases domestic damage
by inducing higher total emission (the indirect eﬀect).
22Remark 4.3.7. If the direct eﬀect is larger (resp. smaller) than the indirect eﬀect, then
Nation 1 prefers a higher (resp. lower) level of adaptation capital than Firm 1.
4.4 The global case
We now consider a third variation on the model described in Section 2. Now suppose
Nation 1 can invest in Nation 2’s private and adaptation capital. By Corollary 3.2.2(C),
an increase in Nation 2’s adaptation capital hurts Firm 1 by reducing its emission, and
therefore its proﬁt, while it hurts Consumer 1 by increasing the total emission. Therefore,
we have
Proposition 4.4.1. Neither Nation 1, nor Firm 1, will invest in Nation 2’s adaptation
capital.
The situation with respect to private capital is somewhat more complicated. Suppose
Nation 1 invests ® = ®¤ > 0 in Nation 2’s private capital to maximize
Z
Θ
¸2(d¯ µ2)u1(µ1;e(¯ µ2;µ1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2) + (®;0))) ¡ ®












where e¤(¯ µ2) = e(¯ µ2;µ1; ¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2) + (®¤;0)) for ¯ µ2 2 Θ. If ¯ µ2 is such that Dtef(t2(¯ µ2 +
¾2(¯ µ2)) + ®¤;e¤
2(¯ µ2)) > 0 (resp. Dtef(t2(¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2)) + ®¤;e¤
2(¯ µ2)) < 0), then Corollary
3.2.2 implies Dt2e¤
1(¯ µ2) < 0 and Dt2e¤
+(¯ µ2) > 0 (resp. Dt2e¤
1(¯ µ2) > 0 and Dt2e¤
+(¯ µ2) < 0).
It follows that, if Dtef(t2(¯ µ2 + ¾2(¯ µ2)) + ®¤;e¤
2(¯ µ2)) > 0 for every ¯ µ2 2 supp¸2, then
Propositions 2.2.2(E) and 3.2.2 and Assumption 2.3.1(b) imply that (4.4.2) cannot hold.
Thus, we have the following results.
Proposition 4.4.3. (A) If Nation 1 believes with certainty that Nation 2’s technology
after investment will be dirty, then Nation 1 will not invest in Nation 2’s private capital.
(B) Nation 1 (resp. Firm 1) invests in Nation 2’s private capital if and only if it
believes with suﬃciently high probability that Nation 2’s technology after investment will
be clean.
(C) If the belief about Nation 2’s type is such that Firm 1 will choose to invest in
23Nation 2’s private capital, then Nation 1 has an even stronger incentive to make such an
investment.
(A) follows from the fact that, given the hypothesis regarding Nation 2’s technology,
an increase in Nation 2’s private capital hurts Firm 1 by reducing its emission and hurts
Consumer 1 by raising total emission. (C) follows as Nation 1 stands to gain from the fall
in total emission in addition to the rise in Firm 1’s emission.
5. Conclusions
5.1 Summary of results
We summarize the main results obtained for the model described in Section 2.1. The
results pertaining to Stages 2 and 3 of the model are largely technical and stated carefully
in Sections 2.3 and 2.2 respectively. The substantive implication of these results is that our
model of the negotiation process is theoretically tractable and possesses very useful prop-
erties: for every proﬁle of types, there is a unique proﬁle of caps that is the unique, globally
asymptotically stable, stationary point of the negotiation process. The assumptions on the
primitives of the model that imply such strong properties also facilitate the comparative
statics results obtained in Section 3.1. Moreover, for every proﬁle of types, the equilibrium
(stationary) proﬁle of caps represents a Pareto improvement over the status quo.
We describe and interpret here in somewhat greater detail the results pertaining to
Stage 1 of the model. All nations will overinvest in domestic adaptation capital (Proposi-
tions 4.2.7). Nations with clean (resp. dirty) technologies will underinvest (resp. overin-
vest) in domestic private capital (Proposition 4.2.8). The eﬀects of these manipulations are
to raise domestic emission, lower foreign emissions and raise the total emission. The results
regarding the domestic investment choices by ﬁrms’ are qualitatively similar (Proposition
4.3.4), but there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For instance, the variables targeted for ma-
nipulation by a nation are the foreign caps (Remark 4.2.9), while the variable targeted by
a ﬁrm is the domestic cap (Remark 4.3.5). Nor is the extent of manipulation the same.
With respect to domestic private capital, a nation with clean (resp. dirty) technology
underinvests (resp. overinvests) less severely than its ﬁrm (Proposition 4.3.6), while the
comparison is ambiguous in the case of adaptation capital (Remark 4.3.7).
Neither nations, nor their ﬁrms, will invest in foreign adaptation capital (Proposition
4.4.1). Neither a nation with clean technology, nor its ﬁrm, will invest in the private capital
of a nation with dirty technology (Proposition 4.4.3). However, private investment across
24nations with clean technology is possible (Proposition 4.4.3) as this has the eﬀect of raising
domestic emission while lowering foreign and total emission.
Our model yields results regarding the ordering of emission caps. Ceteris paribus,
nations with greater adaptation capital have larger caps in equilibrium (Corollary 3.2.3).
The result in terms of private capital depends on the assumption that larger private capital
implies cleaner technology. Given this assumption, ceteris paribus, the emission caps of
nations with dirty (resp. clean) technology are positively (resp. negatively) related to
the size of their private capital (Corollary 3.2.4). Obviously, care needs to be exercised
when applying this result to actual nations. Comparisons based on casual empiricism are
dubious as ceteris paribus rarely holds when comparing actual nations. However, these
results do identify the principles governing the ordering of caps.
Now alter the above scenario by making type modiﬁcations exogenous. Suppose we
identify a nation’s growth with the growth of its private capital. Also suppose that (a)
adaptation capital of both nations is ﬁxed, (b) private capital grows in both nations for
reasons exogenous to our model, and (c) nations with clean technology (the “North”) emit
more than nations with dirty technology (the “South”). Then, Corollary 3.2.2 suggests
that Southern emission rises and Northern emission falls, i.e., their emissions converge. If
technology becomes cleaner as private capital grows, then growth will automatically make
Southern technology cleaner over time.
Our results also have some political-economic implications.
First, in our model, a nation’s equilibrium emission cap is such that it is an active
constraint on the domestic ﬁrm. Growth of a nation’s adaptation capital is a means for
relaxing this constraint. Thus, Green concern, i.e., increasing national welfare by reducing
damage to the consumer, is not the only motive for investment in domestic adaptation
capital; such investment is also a strategic way of gaining head-room for higher equilibrium
emission by the domestic ﬁrm, resulting in higher proﬁt and national welfare. The strategic
motive is particularly strong for nations with clean technology (i.e., nations of the North)
as investment in its private capital makes an already active emission constraint still tighter;
thus, over-investment in adaptation capital is a strategic way of loosening this constraint
or counteracting the eﬀects of private capital growth.
Secondly, the growth of Southern private capital raises total emission, while the growth
of Northern private capital lowers total emission. If a “Green” is someone who wishes to
minimize total emission, then a “Green” will favor private investment (i.e., growth) in the
25North and not in the South. This points to a conﬂict between the objectives of (Northern
and Southern) green lobbies and the growth ambitions of the South.
Thirdly, investment (especially in adaptation capital) is a tool for manipulation in our
model. Consequently, aﬄuent nations with the wherewithal for substantial investments
can manipulate the emission caps in ways that poorer nations cannot do.
5.2 Variations on the theme of this paper
First, we may consider the complement of the above model with tradeable emission
permits instead of autarky. In this case, the ﬁrst two stages of the model remain unchanged,
while the third stage is modelled as a competitive equilibrium. A complicating aspect of
the resulting model is that, unlike in the autarkic model, the Stage 3 emission of every
nation depends on the entire proﬁle of types via the equilibrium price of emission rights.
An analysis of this variation remains as future work.
The second extension is to embed our model in a multi-period one. Clearly, national
types will evolve over time on account of technical change and economic growth. Moreover,
knowledge of the interaction between the economic process and the environment (modelled
by g, h and ±) will evolve over time. The only certainty in this process is that emission
rights will have to be re-allocated periodically. Therefore, learning about the relevant
random processes is important for every nation so that it can position itself better for
future renegotiations. A successful model in this context will have to feature forward-
looking behavior and sophisticated belief formation by the negotiators. Such concerns have
motivated a literature (e.g., Kelly and Kolstad 1999, Kolstad 1996, Ulph and Maddison
1997, Ulph and Ulph 1997) on learning in this context. However, a comprehensive general
model is awaited.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. (A) Fix (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+. As h(t;0) = 0 · e, we have
Γ(t;e) 6= ;. As h is continuous, fv 2 <+ j h(t;v) · eg is closed in <+. As V (t) 2 <+,
[0;V (t)] is compact. Therefore, Γ(t;e) is compact. As g is continuous, Weierstrass’ theorem
implies the existence of v 2 Γ(t;e) such that g(t;v) = supg(t;Γ(t;e)).
We now show that there is a unique solution. Suppose v;v0 2 Γ(t;e) such that
g(t;v) = g(t;v0) = supg(t;Γ(t;e)) and v 6= v0. Let ¸ 2 (0;1). As v;v0 2 Γ(t;e), we have
h(t;v) · e, h(t;v0) · e and v;v0 2 [0;V (t)]. It follows that ¸v+(1¡¸)v0 2 [0;V (t)], and as
h(t;:) is strictly convex, we have h(t;¸v +(1¡¸)v0) < ¸h(t;v)+(1¡¸)h(t;v0) · e. Thus,
¸v + (1 ¡ ¸)v0 2 Γ(t;e), and as g(t;:) is strictly concave, we have g(t;¸v + (1 ¡ ¸)v0) >
¸g(t;v) + (1 ¡ ¸)g(t;v0) = supg(t;Γ(t;e)), a contradiction.
(B) Deﬁne mappings Γ1, Γ2 and Γ, each from <+£ ¯ <+ to <+, by Γ1(t;e) = fv 2 <+ j
h(t;v) · eg, Γ2(t;e) = [0;V (t)] and Γ(t;e) = Γ1(t;e) \ Γ2(t;e) respectively. Suppose Γ is
continuous and has nonempty and compact values. Using this fact, (A) and the continuity
of g, the result follows from the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge 1963, Theorem VI.3).
We now conﬁrm the hypothesized properties of Γ.
Assumptions 2.2.1 implies that 0 2 Γ(t;e) for every (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+. Thus, Γ
has nonempty values. As h is continuous, GrΓ1 is closed in <+ £ ¯ <+ £ <+. It follows
immediately that Γ1 has closed values. As V (t) 2 <++, Γ2 has compact values. Thus, Γ
has compact values.
If Γ2 is upper hemicontinuous, then so is Γ (Berge 1963, Theorem VI.1.7). We show
that Γ2 is upper hemicontinuous. Consider (t;e) 2 <+£¯ <+ and ² > 0. As V is continuous,
there exists an open neighborhood of t in <+, say U, such that V (U) ½ [0;V (t) + ²). It
follows that [0;V (t0)] ½ [0;V (t)+²) for every t0 2 U. Thus, Γ2(U£¯ <+) = [t02U[0;V (t0)] ½
[0;V (t) + ²). Suppose E is open in <+ and Γ2(t;e) = [0;V (t)] ½ E. It follows that there
exists ² > 0 such that [0;V (t) + ²)) ½ E. By the above argument, there exists an open
neighborhood of t in <+, say U, such that Γ2(U £ ¯ <+) ½ [0;V (t) + ²) ½ E, as required.
We now show that Γ is lower hemicontinuous. Consider (t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+ and E open
in <+ such that Γ(t;e) \ E 6= ;.
Suppose e = 0. Then Γ(t;e) = f0g ½ E. As Γ is upper hemicontinuous, there exists an
open neighborhood of (t;e) in <+£ ¯ <+, say U, such that Γ(U) ½ E. Thus, Γ(t0;e0)\E 6= ;
for every (t0;e0) 2 U.
Suppose e > 0. Deﬁne mappings ˆ Γ1, ˆ Γ2 and ˆ Γ, each from <+ £ ¯ <+ to <+, by
ˆ Γ1(t;e) = fv 2 <+ j h(t;v) < eg, ˆ Γ2(t;e) = [0;V (t)) and ˆ Γ(t;e) = ˆ Γ1(t;e) \ ˆ Γ2(t;e)
27respectively. As Γ(t;e) \ E 6= ;, there exists v 2 E such that v 2 [0;V (t)] and h(t;v) · e.
If v = 0, then h(t;v) = 0 < e and v = 0 2 [0;V (t)). Thus, v 2 ˆ Γ(t;e) \ E. If v > 0,
then ; 6= [0;v) ½ ˆ Γ(t;e) as h(t;:) is strictly increasing. As E is open in <+ and v 2 E,
; 6= [0;v) \ E ½ ˆ Γ(t;e) \ E. We conclude that ˆ Γ(t;e) \ E 6= ;.
If ˆ Γ is lower hemicontinuous at (t;e), then there exists an open neighborhood of (t;e)
in <+ £ ¯ <+, say U, such that ; 6= ˆ Γ(t0;e0) \ E ½ Γ(t0;e0) \ E for every (t0;e0) 2 U. Thus,
Γ is lower hemicontinuous at (t;e), as required.
It remains to show that ˆ Γ is lower hemicontinuous. Suppose E is open in <+. As
h and V are continuous, Gr ˆ Γ1 = f(t;e;v) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+ £ <+ j h(t;v) ¡ e < 0g and
Gr ˆ Γ2 = f(t;e;v) 2 <+£¯ <+£<+ j v¡V (t) < 0g are open in <+£¯ <+£<+. Consequently,
Gr ˆ Γ = Gr ˆ Γ1 \ Gr ˆ Γ2 is open in <+ £ ¯ <+ £ <+. Note that
f(t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+ j ˆ Γ(t;e) \ E 6= ;g = ¼(Gr ˆ Γ \ <+ £ ¯ <+ £ E)
where ¼ : <+ £ ¯ <+ £ <+ ! <+ £ ¯ <+ is the projection mapping ¼(t;e;v) = (t;e). As
¼ is an open mapping and Gr ˆ Γ and <+ £ ¯ <+ £ E are open in <+ £ ¯ <+ £ <+, we have
f(t;e) 2 <+ £ ¯ <+ j ˆ Γ(t;e) \ E 6= ;g open in <+ £ ¯ <+. Thus, ˆ Γ is lower hemicontinuous.
(C) and (D) follow immediately from Assumption 2.2.1.
(E) Let e;e0 2 [0;h(t;V (t))] and e < e0. (D) implies h(t;v(t;e)) = e < e0 =
h(t;v(t;e0)). Assumption 2.2.1 implies v(t;e) < v(t;e0) · V (t), and therefore, f(t;e) =
g(t;v(t;e)) < g(t;v(t;e0)) = f(t;e0).
(F) Let e;e0 2 [0;h(t;V (t))] and ¸ 2 (0;1), with e 6= e0. Let v(t;e) = v and v(t;e0) =
v0. By deﬁnition, h(t;v) · e and h(t;v0) · e0. Assumption 2.2.1 implies h(t;¸v + (1 ¡
¸)v0) · ¸h(t;v) + (1 ¡ ¸)h(t;v0) · ¸e + (1 ¡ ¸)e0. Therefore, by Assumption 2.2.1,
f(t;¸e+(1¡¸)e0) ¸ g(t;¸v+(1¡¸)v0) > ¸g(t;v)+(1¡¸)g(t;v0) = ¸f(t;e)+(1¡¸)f(t;e0)
(G) Using (C), if e ¸ h(t;V (t)), then f(t;e) = g(t;v(t;e)) = g(t;V (t)).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. (A) follows immediately from the deﬁnition of V (t).
(B) Consider e > h(t;V (t)). By Proposition 2.2.2(C), v(t;e0) = V (t) for every e0 >
h(t;V (t)). Therefore, Dev(t;e) = 0, and using (A), Dvg(t;v(t;e)) = Dvg(t;V (t)) = 0.
(C) By Proposition 2.2.2(D), if e 2 (0;h(t;V (t))), then h(t;v(t;e)) = e. In this case,
we can combine Assumptions 2.2.1(c) and 2.3.1(a), and use the implicit function theorem
(Lang 1993, XIV, Theorem 2.1) to conclude that v(t;:) is C1 on (0;h(t;V (t))).
28(D) Combining (B), (C) and Assumption 2.3.1(a), it follows that f(t;:) = g(t;v(t;:))
is C1 on (0;h(t;V (t))) [ (h(t;V (t));1).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.5. If ei ¸ h(ti;V (ti)), then Proposition 2.2.2(C) implies
v(ti;ei) = V (ti). It follows that Ui(µi;I;e) = Ui(µi;I;h(ti;V (ti));e¡i) is independent of
ei for ei ¸ h(ti;V (ti)).
Consider ei 2 (0;h(ti;V (ti))). Proposition 2.2.2(D) implies that h(ti;v(ti;ei)) = ei
and Ui(µi;I;e) is given by (2.3.3). Proposition 2.3.2(C) and Assumption 2.3.1(a) yield
Deiv(ti;ei) = 1=Dvih(ti;v(ti;ei)). Using Proposition 2.3.2(D), the derivative of the ﬁrst





As v is continuous, limei"h(ti;V (ti)) v(ti;ei) = v(ti;h(ti;V (ti))) = V (ti) by Proposition



















Therefore, ei = h(ti;V (ti)) cannot maximize (2.3.3). Since Nation i’s expected payoﬀ is
invariant with respect to ei for ei ¸ h(ti;V (ti)), we must have b < h(ti;V (ti)) for every
b 2 ¯i(e¡i;µi;I). It follows from Proposition 2.2.2(D) that h(ti;v(ti;b)) = b for every
b 2 ¯i(e¡i;µi;I).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.13. Let e¤ be a stationary point of (2.3.4). Consider j 2 N.
Using Corollary 2.3.9 and Proposition 2.3.5, we have 0 · e¤
j = ¯j(e¤
¡j;µj) < h(tj;V (tj)).
(2.3.10) implies uj(µj;e¤) ¸ uj(µj;b;e¤
¡j) for every b 2 ¯ <+. Therefore, uj(µj;e¤) ¸
uj(µj;b;e¤
¡j) for every b 2 [0;h(tj;V (tj))]. Consequently, e¤ is a Nash equilibrium of
G(µ).
Conversely, suppose e¤ is a Nash equilibrium of G(µ). Then, for every j 2 N,
e¤
j 2 [0;h(tj;V (tj))] and uj(µj;e¤) ¸ uj(µj;b;e¤
¡j) for every b 2 [0;h(tj;V (tj))]. As
uj(µj;:;e¤
¡j) is strictly concave on [0;h(tj;V (tj))], uj(µj;e¤) > uj(µj;b;e¤
¡j) for every
b 2 [0;h(tj;V (tj))] ¡ fe¤
jg. (2.3.10) implies ¯j(e¤
¡j;µj) ½ [0;h(tj;V (tj))]. Thus, if
29b0 2 ¯ <+ ¡ [0;h(tj;V (tj))], then there exists b 2 [0;h(tj;V (tj))], such that uj(µj;b;e¤
¡j) >
uj(µj;b0;e¤




every j 2 N. Thus, e¤ is a stationary point of (2.3.4).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.14. Consider the game G(µ). By Assumption 2.2.1(a), each
player’s strategy set is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of <. Proposition 2.2.2(B)
and Assumption 2.3.1(b) imply that each player’s payoﬀ function is continuous. Propo-
sition 2.2.2(F) and Assumption 2.3.1(b) imply that each player’s payoﬀ is concave in his
own strategy. Thus, by Nash’s existence theorem, G(µ) has a Nash equilibrium, which is
a stationary point of (2.3.4) by Proposition 2.3.13.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.18. Fix i 2 N and a stationary point e of (2.3.4). Let Rj =
[ej;h(tj;V (tj))] for j 2 N and let R =
Q
j2N Rj. Corollary 2.3.11 ensures that IntR 6= ;.
Given x 2 R¡feg, deﬁne ej = (e1;:::;ej) and xj = (xj;:::;xn) for j = 1;:::;n; formally
deﬁne (e0;x1) = x and (en;xn+1) = e.
Consider x 2 R such that x 6= (h(tj;V (tj)))j2N and x 6= e. Assumption 2.3.1(b)
implies Dekui(µi;x) = ¡De+±(ki;x+) < 0 for every k 2 N ¡ fig. Corollary 2.3.9 and
Assumption 2.3.1(b) imply that














Given z 2 R ¡ feg, it follows that














Proof of Proposition 3.1.2. (A) Consider (t;e) 2 <2
++ such that e < h(t;V (t)). It fol-
lows from Proposition 2.2.2(D) that v = v(t;e) maximizes g(t;v) subject to the constraint
30h(t;v) = e. Thus, there exists ¸(t;e) 2 < such that Dvg(t;v(t;e))+¸(t;e)Dvh(t;v(t;e)) =
0 and h(t;v(t;e)) ¡ e = 0. Assumption 3.1.1(c) implies that the mapping
(t;e;v;¸) 7! (Dvg(t;v) + ¸Dvh(t;v);h(t;v) ¡ e)
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. As Assumption 2.2.1(c) implies that the matrix
µ
Dvvg(t;v(t;e)) + ¸(t;e)Dvvh(t;v(t;e)) Dvh(t;v(t;e))
Dvh(t;v(t;e)) 0
¶
is non-singular, the implicit function theorem (Lang 1993, XIV, Theorem 2.1) guarantees
the existence of C2 functions (t0;e0) 7! v(t0;e0) and (t0;e0) 7! ¸(t0;e0) for some open neigh-
borhood of (t;e). It follows immediately that f is C2 on f(t;e) 2 <2
++ j e < h(t;V (t))g.
(B) Suppose e;t;t0 2 <+, t < t0, e · h(t;V (t)) and e · h(t0;V (t0)). Proposition
2.2.2(D) and Assumption 3.1.1(a) imply h(t;v(t;e)) = e = h(t0;v(t0;e)) = h(t + t0 ¡
t;v(t0;e)) < h(t;v(t0;e)). Assumption 2.2.1(c) implies v(t;e) < v(t0;e) and the deﬁnition
of v implies v(t0;e) · V (t0). Therefore, Assumptions 3.1.1(a) and 2.2.1(b) imply f(t;e) =
g(t;v(t;e)) < g(t0;v(t;e)) < g(t0;v(t0;e)) = f(t0;e).
(C) This follows from Proposition 3.1.2(A) and Assumption 3.1.1(c).
Proof of Proposition 3.1.5. We simplify notation via the following conventions. As µ is
given, we shall suppress it in all expressions. By convention: f(tj;:) ´ fj and ±(kj;:) ´ ±j.
We start with two preliminary steps, (®) and (¯), before proving (A) and (B).
(®) Diﬀerentiating (3.1.3) with respect to x yields the equation ADxe = b, where A

























Let Aj be the (n¡1)£(n¡1) matrix derived from A by eliminating the ﬁrst row and the





(2.3.8) implies that, for every i 2 N,
Deiejui =
½
Deieifi ¡ De+e+±i; if j = i
¡De+e+±i; if j 2 N ¡ fig
31We ﬁrst evaluate detAj for j 2 N ¡ f1g. Subtracting the ﬁrst column of Aj from


















¡De+e+±j¡1 0 ::: Dej¡1ej¡1fj¡1 0 ::: 0
¡De+e+±j 0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0



































0 ::: Dej¡1ej¡1fj¡1 ¡De+e+±j¡1 0 ::: 0
0 ::: 0 ¡De+e+±j 0 ::: 0

















As interchanging adjacent columns changes the sign of a determinant, we have















(¯) Although the following arguments are standard, we provide them for the sake of
completeness.
By the fundamental theorem of algebra (Markushevich 1965, Theorem 17.7), A has
n roots. As A is real, its characteristic polynomial has real coeﬃcients. Therefore, the
conjugate of every complex root of A with multiplicity m is also a root of A with multiplicity
m. Therefore, the product of all complex roots is positive. As A is similar to its Jordan
canonical form (Gantmacher 1990, Section VI.6.3), detA equals the product of its roots.
(2.3.16) implies that A is a row dominant diagonal matrix. Corollary 2.3.9 implies that A
has a negative diagonal.
32Suppose ¸ is a root of A with a non-negative real part. Let jcj denote the modulus
of a complex number c. As aii < 0 for every i 2 N, jaii ¡ ¸j ¸ jaiij >
P
j2N¡fig jaijj for
every i 2 N. This implies H = A ¡ ¸I is an n £ n complex matrix with a row dominant
diagonal. H is singular as ¸ is a root of A. Thus, there exists a complex n-tuple x 6= 0
such that Hx = 0, which implies hiixi+
P
j2N¡fig hijxj = 0 for every i 2 N. The triangle
inequality implies



















Let k 2 N be such that jxkj ¸ jxjj for every j 2 N. It follows that jhkkjjxkj ·
P
j2N¡fkg jhkjjjxkj = jxkj
P
j2N¡fkg jhkjj. As x 6= 0, jxkj > 0. Therefore, jhkkj ·
P
j6=k jhkjj, a contradiction. Thus, all the roots of A have negative real parts.
It follows that detA > 0 if and only if n is even. By copying this argument, we have
detA1 < 0 if and only if n is even.





for every n and j 2 N ¡ f1g. The result follows from (A:3) and Assumption 2.3.1(b).
(B) follows from (A:2) and (¯).

































¡1 0 ::: 0












j2N ej = De1xu1 detL=detA = ¡De1xu1
Qn
k=2 Dekekfk=detA. Note that
Qn
k=2 Dekekfk < 0 if and only if n is even. The result follows from (¯).
Proof of Corollary 3.2.3. Let k1 > k2. Assumptions 2.3.1(b) and 3.1.1(d) imply
0 < De+±(k1;e+(µ)) < De+±(k2;e+(µ)). This and (3.1.3) implies
R e1(µ)
e2(µ) dxDeef(t;x) =
Def(t;e1(µ)) ¡ Def(t;e2(µ)) < 0. Proposition 2.2.2(F) implies e1(µ) > e2(µ).
Proof of Corollary 3.2.4. Suppose t1 > t2, Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0 and Dtef(t2;e2(µ)) > 0.
Assumption (c) implies Dtef(x;e1(µ)) > Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0 for every x 2 [t2;t1]. (3.1.3)
implies Def(t1;e1(µ)) = Def(t2;e2(µ)). Therefore,
Z e2(µ)
e1(µ)
dy Deef(t2;y) = Def(t2;e2(µ)) ¡ Def(t2;e1(µ))






Proposition 2.2.2(F) implies e1(µ) > e2(µ). The other case follows analogously.
34Notes
1. Our aim is to work out the consequences of the regime modelled in this paper, not
to rationalize any actual environmental protocol. While the number of actual protocols
is very large, most are merely exhortative. Improving on this situation requires us to
understand, ex ante, the consequences of diﬀerent strategies for constructing a protocol.
In this paper, we analyze one version of the quantity-rationing strategy.
2. We should warn the reader that the “national ﬁrm” is not state-controlled. It
is a standard proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm. A regulatory scheme determines the allocation of
emission rights implied by an emission cap. This allocation determines each ﬁrm’s con-
strained production set. By aggregating the constrained production sets, we may derive
the national ﬁrm’s emission-cap-constrained production set.
3. We identify “reached” with asymptotic convergence.
4. As a result, in parts of the literature (e.g., the cooperative game approach), the
status quo emission choices are modelled as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game
played among the nations. This is not a compelling description of the status quo as the
emission decision is made by emitters rather than by the state. It is doubtful that, in the
absence of an explicit capping protocol, domestic regulators attempt, much less succeed in,
the alignment of domestic emitters’ incentives with those of the state so as to force them
to take into account the international emission externality. At best, status quo regulation
is designed to force emitters to take into account domestic localized externalities, rather
than international ones.
5. Apart from d’Aspremont et al. (1983), this approach has a formal aﬃnity to the
literature on stable cartels (Donsimoni et al. 1986), and an informal aﬃnity with the
literature on coalition formation (e.g., Aumann and Dreze 1983, Bernheim et al. 1987,
Hart and Kurz 1983, Ray and Vohra 1997).
6. We are implicitly assuming in (2.3.4) that the best response mapping is single-
valued, i.e., a function. This property will be derived below in Corollary 2.3.9.
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